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The figure of Melville’s monomaniacal captain, who would subdue all the 
forces of the world to the exigencies of his tormented mind, and who at any 
rate drives the living community on board the Pequod into oblivion in his 
obsessive hunt for “his” white whale, would not appear to be the obvious 
character to introduce a work of political analysis. But in Bruce Jesson’s Only 
Their Purpose is Mad (1999) – the title is a loose adaptation of a line spoken 
by Ahab – this classic character makes a striking appearance. In seeing the 
nineteenth-century Ahab as representative of certain problems in our times, 
Jesson is as much interested in the role and influence of ideas as he is in 
examining the political causes of what he sees as New Zealand’s on-going 
social ills. And in using this potently emblematic character from Melville’s 
novel to illustrate his concerns, Jesson refreshes the seemingly outdated 
notion that literature – and the range of ideas generated therein – allows us 
revealing glimpses into the complex experience of our lives through altering 
the perceptual light through which we view our social-historical atmospheres. 
That Jesson’s trenchant analysis is political in content and intent breathes 
vigour into his methods and prompts us be alert to the changes occurring 
around us. Looking at contemporary New Zealand in the presence, as it were, 
of the towering figure Captain Ahab, I found myself thinking more and more of 
John Mulgan’s novel Man Alone and how this too, although aesthetically and 
stylistically opposite to Melville’s massive tome, offers an interesting 
perspective on the present situation. 
In performing what is essentially a critique of the ideology of the New Right 
in New Zealand, Jesson’s interrogation has a broad reach, if only by 
implication. For his subject is in effect modern capitalism, the present free-
market competition model being the latest permutation of our Western way (a 
phenomenon now colloquially referred to in such generalising terms as 
globalisation and internationalisation). Jesson’s principal concern is with the 
shift in political power as enacted in the New Right’s auctioning off of New 
Zealand’s economic, political and social “soul” to the faceless elite of global 
finance in the name of economic “rationalism”. It is, he argues convincingly, 
an act of “madness”, yet one performed according to the most rational of 
processes. This is the pivotal paradox, as characterised by Ahab, who is both 
the representative captain of the industrial, if not imperial, giant of the day – 
Kōtare 3, no. 2 (2000), pp. 46–55. 
 47
the powerful American whaling industry of the nineteenth century – and, in the 
dramatic terms of the narrative, the “insane” master of men. Grown grotesque 
in his hubristic excess – he is at once wounded Promethean, enraged Learian 
solipsist, and theatrical despot; his sin is to make a blasphemous god-head of 
his own pride and force his crew into self-sacrificial worship – we must also 
see that he is “captained” by his own indomitable will, that “unconquerable 
captain in the soul” (Melville, 671) as Melville has him phrase it.1 Ahab, then, 
effects a destructive distortion of his individual self; or, to touch on a crucial 
distinction, his individuality is transposed to a political dimension – he creates, 
organises and dictates a system of sorts, however “mad”, around his enraged 
self. The protagonist in Mulgan’s novel also creates and lives by a system, 
and although it is to all appearances wholly different to Ahab’s, I would argue 
that in terms of its political significance, it stands in complementary relation. 
As errant commander, disengaged from the regulating forces of land-borne 
institutions, Ahab perverts both the function of the ship-board community and 
the purpose of the industrial hunt; and if the men are cruelly subordinated to 
his will, this, to some extent, occurs through their being seduced into believing 
they have been elevated to the ennobling sphere of Ahab’s all-commanding 
personae – absorbed into the idea of a man who is himself ultimately defined 
by an idée fixe. Melville exaggerates this aspect of Ahab for what are very 
effective dramatic purposes; but for Jesson, Ahab serves to symbolise the 
negative social effects of the New Right politics – the disabling of New 
Zealand’s productive economic capabilities and the fragmentation of 
community as a result of a similarly “mad” political system – a set of practices 
at whose ideological heart is a destructive form of individualism. 
It is this view of individualism as promoting and installing a potentially 
destructive idea of self that I think is interesting, partly because individualism 
(broadly speaking) is such an integral aspect of our Western cultural selves, 
and so is something we are apt to overlook, or whose importance we are 
inclined to downplay. Strictly speaking, individualism denotes a social theory 
that determines the degree of freedom permitted for the definition of self; but 
as the term itself clearly indicates, this social theory is predicated on the idea 
of the individual and individuality; and since the idea of the individual is the 
conceptual cornerstone of Western culture, we all to some extent or another 
                                            
1 Alive, like its narrator, Ishmael, with the “riddles of the universe”, Moby Dick is oceanic in 
imaginative scope. A vast and heretical fusion of epic, comedy, tragedy, adventure story, 
seafaring yarn, tall tale and philosophical treatise, rushing and swirling with dramatic incident, 
rhetorical virtuosity, metaphor and symbol, Moby Dick also achieves a unity that springs out of 
an inner dynamic of paradox and antinomy. In many ways, Ahab – “insanely” rational, calmly 
contemplative in his “madness”, thus the embodiment of these constitutional contrarieties – is 
the centre of the novel, the commanding figure in every sense of the word. 
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conceive of ourselves and our immediate worlds according to this creed – 
notwithstanding the on-going contemporary critical obsession with proclaiming 
and anatomising the “death of the bourgeois subject”. Since it is implicit and 
fundamental to so much of what we take for granted, the finer degrees of this 
constitutive individualism can be difficult to discuss clearly and with any 
conceptual precision, although there is a vast body of theoretical literature 
devoted to this very task. Moreover, while we can see examples of 
individualism in much of our cultural surrounds and in many aspects of our 
interior makeup, to suggest that we can cleanly isolate this element, however 
fundamental, from other features of society is inevitably a little misleading. For 
this reason, complex figures such as Captain Ahab – Mephistophelian “hero”, 
paradoxically noble in his sacrilegious tyranny; compelling in the pernicious 
extremities of his self-exceptionality – can help focus our critical attention in 
ways that sociological discussion can not always achieve.  
In critical commentary, Ahab is routinely described as a character in whom 
are concentrated the motivating energies of expansionist capitalistic America 
in the nineteenth century and, in what is essentially inseparable, the ideology 
of American individualism that is so fundamental to the American character. 
That this “imperial self” is both a creature of fiction and of another era, might 
seem reassuring; yet, to extend on Jesson’s idea by way of a speculative 
question, is it possible to see this “character” being reanimated today in a far 
more generalised form? That is, in contemporary New Zealand, and in the 
individualism that Bruce Jesson speaks of as having arisen via the 
ascendency of new right politics over the last fifteen years, are we witnessing 
the transformation of the “imperial” frontier stereotype of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, in effect both a magnification and crystallisation of the 
Western “way” as it is remodelled and readapted for its guiding role in the new 
internationalised global order? And does this, then, mark the “imperialistic” 
triumph of American culture, whose political and cultural influence it is difficult 
to argue with? For many, as this ineluctable process of globalisation threatens 
to erase identity-defining borders, questions such as these are pressing. It is 
not my intention to attempt any sort of comprehensive answer here; however, 
what I would like to suggest is that John Mulgan’s Man Alone attains a 
renewed relevance in light of the sort of connection Jesson outlines, for what 
it offers the contemporary reader is a critical and sharpened perspective on 
individualism – on the fundamental ways in which we conceive of, and the 
assumptions we harbour about, ourselves – and, by extension, the manner in 
which, in certain distorting ways, it is used to underwrite predominating 
political practices.  
In New Zealand, as in other modern Western democratic societies, 
concerns about what are seen as destructive strains of individualism have 
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erupted periodically. For various reasons, the balance between the rights and 
freedoms of individuals and the demands and obligations of society is thrown 
out, with complaints most often surrounding concerns about pernicious bouts 
of self-interest, narcissism and communal inadequacy amongst the populace 
(the classic liberal ideal of enlightened self-interest is vulnerable to what some 
see as the corruptions of vulgar, self-gratifying materialism – the effects of the 
citizen/consumer exercising freedom of choice and self-expression). And, 
while we are, and need to be sensitive and alert to an overly coercive and 
intrusive state, there is the other extreme with which we are all familiar, and 
which is encapsulated in Margaret Thatcher’s much-quoted claim that there is 
no such thing as society – the New Right individualism that asserts a far more 
direct link between the individual and the overarching ideology of nationalism. 
This points to the paradoxical issue that concerns Jesson, the situation in 
which a destructive form of individualism is imposed on the community, a 
move that is sanctioned through the self-justifying logic of democratic rights 
that safeguard and enhance individual freedom.  
From such positions, the ensuing discussions inevitably tap into a vast 
matrix of interrelated moral, ethical and political issues, and, as has been the 
case in America for the last ten years, the debate is often rehearsed under the 
crudely simplistic rubric of “communitarianism vs. individualism” (while on the 
broader social and political front there is the fractious tussle of “identity 
politics”.) While on the theoretical and philosophical level there are different 
shadings and categories of individualism, in practice, as it were, there is a 
waxing and waning of emphasis due to social and political and economical 
circumstances. At present, it is orthodox to assert the “social constructivist” 
and purportedly liberating notion that we consist of a plurality of possible 
selves, since the very notion of the individual is an ideological myth, 
preventing us from claiming an absolute essence, or irreducible centre, of self. 
This might be called the New World syndrome: in being freed from the 
traditional (Enlightenment) idea of the self, we can (it is implied) endlessly and 
effortlessly “construct” versions of our selves appropriate to the 
circumstances. It can also be viewed as a clever marketing ruse: to see our 
identities in terms of exchangeable “products” deftly prepares us for the ever-
expanding market of postmodernity by discouraging us from acting and 
thinking according to principals that exist beyond the imperatives of 
commodity flow. 
Clearly, the issue is knotty, and has as much to do with the tendency 
towards the programmatic application of ideas as it does with the core 
concept of the individualised self. Indeed, Melville’s Promethean “superman” 
underlines the extent to which a cult of the individual arises so successfully: 
the idealised heroic individual, exemplary in their self-governing uniqueness, 
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is always the potential autocrat, one who would suppress another’s genuine 
individuality – in the sense of being not simply corporealy distinct, but 
intellectually and politically independent of thought and action, and thus 
possessing the right to resist – in the process of coming into full possession of 
their selves. To point towards the principal and essentially metaphysical 
theme in Mulgan’s novel, it is also important to remember that (after Milan 
Kundera) being is not necessarily synonymous with being one’s self. 
Investigating the myriad aspects of this condition (and conditioning) of being – 
of the manifold particularities and dimensions of self – is the stuff of a great 
deal of fiction: Kundera, echoing D.H.Lawrence and Walter Benjamin, defines 
the novel precisely in terms of its prolonged attempt to answer the questions, 
“What is an individual? Wherein does his identity reside?”. In his extended 
dramatisation of the destructive forces associated with one man’s claim to a 
sovereignty of self in Moby Dick, Herman Melville provides an example of 
what many others have, from across a vast stylistic spectrum, touched on in 
their fiction. 
In showing us how the character Ahab stands as a metaphor for 
dominating aspects of our contemporary experience, Jesson also encourages 
us to look around the cultural landscape for revealing signs. Across the 
shifting panorama of popular culture, the interested observer can find a great 
variety of images on a multitude of cultural surfaces reflecting the ethos of 
individualism; arguably, even the increasingly challenged model of the nuclear 
family is primarily individualistic in concept. Amongst these common-place, 
mass-marketed appeals to our sense of individuality, some speak more 
directly than others of the ever-seductive idea of power in the form of 
indomitable selfhood, of self-command and the commanding self, although 
few, if any, exist on Ahab’s scale of theatrical magnitude. What I have noticed, 
and what may well be the result of the shifting political energies and order of 
Western capitalism in the early twenty-first century, is a certain severity of 
tone in the popularised image of selfhood. In advertising and the televisual 
media, the defining images of contemporaneity evince a shrewdly efficient 
containment or molding of energy and will, a business-like harnessing of 
vitality into a hardened shell of self-projection. Missing is any sense of 
celebration or inner elation, of imminent abandonment and release, of actually 
enjoying this state of affirmative individuality, however simulated that may be. 
There is no sense of liberating bohemianism, of ludic antinomianism, no 
fluster of innocent recklessness ruffling the posture. If there is some 
ontological solace to be gained through believing in our essential and 
inviolable individuality - and there is nothing we respond to with such 
instinctual alacrity as this comforting idea of our free and empowered selves - 
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this aura of mutedly grim determination introduces a conspicuously 
compromising tone. 
What I take to be this pervasive mood of oddly solemn self-possession puts 
me in mind of the character Johnson, the “lone man” in John Mulgan’s novel, 
Man Alone (1939). As the title suggests, there is a central existential theme in 
this novel, and as Lawrence Jones argues in The Oxford History of New 
Zealand Literature, Man Alone initiated a trend, if not a “genre”, in modern 
New Zealand fiction (with Kundera’s statement in mind, this suggests the 
interesting idea that the novel in New Zealand has developed a culturally 
specific character in terms of its preoccupation with and treatment of an 
existential theme). At one point, as Johnson prepares for flight in the wake of 
what will be contrued as his murder of the farmer Stenning, we are told of his 
thoughts concerning his life to this point in New Zealand (circa 1930s): “If he 
could get away he could keep some things. He could keep the one thing he 
had had in all the years he had known this country, and that was the freedom 
to go and to work and to live where he liked” (127). For those of us who put 
our faith in democracy, this description of New Zealand would certainly make 
it, politically and socially, “God’s own country” – although, as the subjunctive 
tense suggests, for Johnson, it is, in a sense, already in the past. What is 
expressed here is a philosophical commonplace: the liberty to be one’s 
individual self is inseparable from the freedom to move and act at will and on 
whim (even if that means having to work - a fact which touches on latent 
philosophical questions concerning the very concept of freedom itself). But 
what I find curious is the possessive language Mulgan uses, by which 
freedom becomes a material “thing” that his character in some sense owns. 
Linguistically, it is not unusual to think of “having” (and thus losing) one’s 
freedom; but this is a little different to “being” free. It is a distinction that is 
brought out somewhat obliquely in the novel: notwithstanding Mulgan’s 
“objective” and starkly understated literary style and detached third person 
narration, Johnson is never described as experiencing within himself an 
empowering condition of free agency. That is, he is never shown to have – in 
any convincingly dramatic sense – the very thing he fears losing.  
This might indicate a logical or structural inconsistency in the narrative, an 
impression that is reinforced by the fact that, given the freedom and 
opportunity of the time and place, Johnson is not seen to be motivated by any 
drive to be successful in the manner that is common among others he meets. 
Described at one point early on as feeling “strong” and “alive” because he was 
“in charge of himself” (36), his entire manner is one of a curious 
ambitionlessness. When he describes his “system” of living – “it’s the keep on 
working and moving, it’s the hard work for the good time and never stay long 
anywhere” (44) – there is never any sense of invigorating aimlessness in his 
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picaresque mobility. We could read this in terms that are closer to the 
existentialist literary tradition, and yet Johnson never appears to be a vehicle 
for Mulgan to explore and test, in a fuller dramatic sense, the philosophical 
concept of freedom and the shifting modulations of identity – Johnson does 
not act in a way that indicates an attempt to understand in some fundamental 
way his self in existence. It is as if he doesn’t know what to do with himself; or, 
as I want to contend, does not know in any fully conscious way how be his 
self, or rather the self that he feels in some way he should be. Instead his 
sense of freedom and thus self is a reductively negative or defensive one; 
initially goaded by an incurable restlessness to which he submits with a weary 
resignation (until he is driven by fear of incarceration), he keeps on the move 
and largely to himself. In fact, the general tone and atmosphere of the novel 
reinforces this: the narrative is so thoroughly suffused with an enervating 
despondency that Johnson seems only ever to endure the “free” life he leads 
up until his “escape” mid-way through the novel.  
In being reduced to such existential bare essentials - this is the dramatic 
and philosophical core of the novel - his desire to retain possession of his 
freedom actually reinforces what, as is conveyed in the novel’s sullen refrain, 
is his self-defeating aloneness: “Most of the time a man spends too much 
alone” (205). What, then, if it can in any way be said to exist, is the real nature 
of the freedom Johnson wants to protect? Entwined as it is in the compulsion 
to be “alone”, are we then compelled to review the very idea of the free self as 
embodied in Mulgan’s protagonist, just as Johnson, during his struggle in the 
bush, comes “to hate the heavy silence of the bush … where before he had 
welcomed it as a sanctuary” (144)? In evading both capture and death 
through exposure, Johnson is not shown to emerge bristling with Promethean 
pride, the lone and romantic hero as bastion of true and just values;2 and we 
never get any convincing sense that he emerges from his trial having learnt 
uplifting or edifying lessons of humility and self-denial through hardship – that 
will power and discipline are valuable qualities of character for life in the 
frontier. Underlining this is the fact that the isolated moments in which 
Johnson experiences what are described as quickening feelings of community 
– amongst the gathering of protesters on the way to the Queen Street riots 
and in the company of Jack O’Reilly as they prepare to leave for the Spanish 
Civil War very near the end of the novel – are instances that both arise out of, 
and will be immediately dissolved in, violence (in the latter case, it is implied 
rather than actual, as it occurs off-stage). While we can see in these fleeting 
                                            
2 In his introduction to the Penguin edition (1990), Patrick Evans argues that the novel 
appeals to us fifty years after its publication as “a powerful example of male romanticism” (p. 
v), an argument which I find unconvincing. 
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and doomed “unions” an unarticulated relief that arises out of the “freedom” 
not to have to go it entirely alone – not to have to continually make the 
exhausting existential decision to be “free” – the conspicuous and troubled 
transience of these “connections” would appear to scratch a nihilistic line 
through the very idea of fraternity. The dramatic and philosophical implications 
of the loss of his freedom must be measured against these characteristics of 
the novel. 
Before elaborating on what I feel is a compellingly odd and fundamental 
irresolution in the text, a quality that makes Mulgan’s novel all the more 
interesting in terms of offering a provocative view on individualism, it is 
important to acknowledge several other factors. It should be said that in the 
context, the deflating mood and tone of the novel makes a certain sense, 
since, most immediately, Johnson, like many of the people he meets in this 
time of troubled mid-war peace, faces the prospect of dispossession, be it 
land or the opportunity to earn a wage.3 It is a condition brought about by the 
wider historical and cultural forces impinging upon both protagonist and 
author - the political and economic effects of the Depression coupled with a 
mid-war anxiety. The peculiar thinness of the narrative is further reinforced 
through Mulgan’s attempt at writing with Hemingwayesque “masculine” 
empirical directness; in fact, for some, this might represent an aesthetic 
shortcoming in that this style prevents by its very nature any fuller exploration 
and evocation of character.4  
Beyond these factors, the most influential way of explaining Man Alone is in 
terms of social critique. Lawrence Jones endorses the common view that 
Mulgan’s depiction of the alienated individual is a means of criticising the 
repressive forces of a conformist puritanical society. Johnson’s existentially 
and spiritually impoverished existence, then, is a direct product and indicting 
reflection of a life-denying society – a concern that becomes a “favourite 
provincial theme” in New Zealand fiction (Jones 203, 157). While Jones 
reminds us that contemporary novels focus less on the repressive wrongs of 
society and more on the inner existential struggle, what needs to be said is 
that this sort of dichotomy has an almost archetypal appeal to those of us 
reared in societies in which individualism is of a primary importance.  
I’m not so sure it is a simple matter of there being a clash between a 
monolithic and shackling community and the sensitive individual, in and 
through whose struggles we can gauge the condition of society (Jones in 
Sturm, 164). After all, this romanticises the individual (expand); also, this 
                                            
3 There is something of a bleak irony at work here as suggested by Johnson's comment, “I've 
been in wars, there's nothing in them. The peace is more dangerous”(204).  
4 It could also be argued that Mulgan was not able to screen out his own tacit nihilism, one 
which may have propelled him to his suicide in 1945. 
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approach places the emphasis on the individual being condemned to an 
isolating “freedom” or alienation, whereas Mulgan’s “man alone” is frequently 
described as preferring and cultivating dissociation – his “system” that dictates 
freedom of choice and movement and yet which is actually enervating. This is 
peculiarly irrational and contradictory since it is not given dramatic support or 
justification in the novel (he is does not act in rebellion or subversion). When, 
near the end, we and he are left with his perplexed realisation that his life has 
been governed by “a restlessness that would not leave him in peace” (196), I 
think it is plausible to contend that Johnson has been suffering throughout an 
unconscious disillusionment with, and existential incapacity in the face of the 
idea of him self as a free agent. To put this another way, the promise of 
autonomous selfhood and the untrammelled freedom with which this 
correlates cannot satisfactorily translate as lived fulfillment. This not stated in 
any dramatically explicit sense; rather, just as Johnson at the beginning and 
end of the novel ominously refers to “the bit in between” the two wars – the 
“dangerous” peace that is his life in New Zealand, the very subject of 
Mulgan’s narrative (6/204) – so the novel, in never convincingly evoking 
Johnson’s experience of being free in “God’s own country”, states the case 
through, as it were, an absence. One significant reason for this peace being 
“dangerous” is that it puts the issue of life, of self and purpose, in existential 
relief: released from the cohering forces of war – that grim paradox of 
purposeful and uniting violence – Johnson is alone in the most confronting 
and challenging of ways, for he is alone, and, in a sense at a complete loss 
with, his “free” self; or more importantly, with the idea and ideal of 
autonomous selfhood. What Mulgan’s novel achieves, then, in its odd 
irresolution is a pressing sense of ambiguity about the very idea of 
individualistic self. It does not propose alternative models but rather brings the 
very idea of self into focus, albeit obliquely. Like Melville’s great novel, in 
which the famous narrator Ishmael comes to understand through his fraternal 
bond with Queequeg a new way of seeing his self – one in marked contrast to 
the rampant individualism of Ahab – so Mulgan’s novel, in an invertedly 
complementary way, offers us a quirky meditation on being one’s self. 
My purpose here has not been to either implicitly disavow or celebrate 
some notion of pure individuality or to tacitly idealise the idea and experience 
of community. The complexity of contemporary life renders such aims 
impossible, at least for those who want to think beyond politically 
fundamentalist platitudes. But that such platitudes exist and influence our lives 
is the very point. After all, the idea of our exalted uniqueness as propagated 
endlessly by our commodifying free-market societies becomes, all too easily, 
a deceiving mythology that substitutes a superficial and spurious set of 
consumer rights for the more important political rights of the citizen. That most 
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of us are now familiar with what might be called the dubious politics of 
individualism that are central to the New Right agenda should give us cause 
for concern. Translated to the political rhetoric of these linguistically blighted 
days, we can see words such as “freedom” and “individual rights” growing 
distorted in sense, words that are used to justify the “liberating” of thousands 
of care-dependent people to the streets in the name of “deinstitutionalisation”, 
to argue for the abolition of unions in the name of “free enterprise” and to 
worship the mythicised coterie of rich and famous “winners” as models of 
desirable selfhood. In the same way, and given what appears to be the 
inexorable and America-lead globalisation of economies and thus cultures, we 
need to be attentive to the discrepancies between the language and ideas 
promoting these developments and the local, political realities. And while it is 
attractive, and overly easy for that reason, to see the broad sweep of Western 
culture as a new form of American-style frontierism and its emphasis on 
individualism, it is novels such as Moby Dick and Man Alone that encourage 
us to be sceptical about the ideas that are intrinsic to our culture. 
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